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ABSTRACT
The complexity of public procurement and the related controls are a sig-
nificant issue that public authorities are facing in Hungary. The “fear” of 
being controlled by state authorities and EU auditors is affecting deci-
sions in public procurement. However, research on the effects of such 
a system is largely absent. The purpose of the article is to explore the 
functioning of the control system related to EU funded public procure-
ments and to examine its actual and potential impact on the purchases of 
public authorities. The method is first an introduction of the features of 
the control system and then the analysis of data from the relevant bod-
ies in order to see the effect of controls and possible difficulties with the 
system. The results show that despite the seemingly positive impact on 
the regularity of procedures, the interference in the decisions of public 
authorities and the delays caused are problematic. It is therefore sug-
gested that the Hungarian government should consider streamlining the 
control process such as through checks based on samples or focusing on 
the most risky procedures. The research is the first academic analysis of 
data related to public procurement control in Hungary, yet it can already 
inspire the Hungarian and other governments to review the effective-
ness of such procedures and to reduce administrative burdens for public 
authorities as much as possible.
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1 Introduction
When purchasing goods and services public administration bodies across the 
European Union must use a public procurement procedure. This can be a long 
and complicated process which can often be challenging for public authori-
ties. The process of purchasing through public procurement involves a num-
ber of stages and in each of these the public authority (contracting authority) 
has to make some kind of decision. In case the procedure is not followed, rem-
edies may be sought before the national review bodies where damages can 
be awarded or even the contract may be declared ineffective. In addition, the 
correct use of public procurement receives special attention in the context of 
EU funded projects, since an incorrect application of the rules1 can lead to a 
finding of irregularities and therefore financial corrections (i.e. a withdrawal 
of funding from a project) (European Commission, 2013).
The use of EU funds is monitored by a number of bodies including the Euro-
pean Commission, the European Court of Auditors and national audit authori-
ties. In order to avoid public procurement irregularities, it is useful to establish 
additional control systems at national level which help to avoid these. Here 
we focus on controlling the legality of the actions of contracting authorities. 
This can also be referred to as supervision of public procurements (Bianchi 
and Guidi 2010) or audit of compliance (OECD, 2013).
Hungary has established a control system for EU funded public procure-
ments. While all EU Member States are obliged to have adequate systems 
of supervision and control, no other country is known in Europe that would 
control public procurements on such a large scale. The Hungarian system in-
volves controlling documents and procedures both ex ante and during the 
procedure itself for all EU funded procurements above the EU thresholds 
for goods and services and above HUF 300 million (approx. EUR 1 million) for 
works contracts.2 In addition, ex post controls exist for all procedures below 
these values.
The principal aim of this article is to show the functioning of the Hungarian 
control system and to investigate how this rigorous control system is im-
pacting on the functioning of public authorities, when the procurement is at 
least partially funded from EU sources. The article includes both a theoretical 
analysis of the difficulties related to the control system and data received 
from the control body is also analysed in order to estimate the actual effect of 
controls on the behaviour of public authorities. Our hypothesis is that public 
authorities take more care when carrying out public procurement, although 
this, and the length of the control process itself is likely to cause delays in the 
process. Further, if the procurement is not prepared with due care, then this 
can result in even more interruptions in the process due to repeated calls for 
1 Public procurement in the EU is governed by the public procurement directives, i.e. Directive 
2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU.
2 The general EU threshold for goods and services is EUR 144 000 for central government au-
thorities, EUR 221 000 for other contracting authorities and EUR 5 548 000 for works con-
tracts. A separate control system exists for certain public procurements funded from purely 
national funds, but this article focuses on EU funded public procurements.
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missing documents by the control body or a refusal to grant a green light for 
the process. While little reference can be found in the academic literature to 
such an analysis of control systems of other countries, brief mention is also 
made of the types of controls that exist elsewhere.
The present article first describes the processes involved in EU public procure-
ment procedures and the mandatory controls carried out by the Hungarian 
control authorities and how this compares with the systems in other coun-
tries. A theoretical analysis on the possible impact on the control system is 
followed by a discussion and analysis of data received from the Department 
of Public Procurement Control (DPPC) of the Prime Minister’s Office to see 
also how far the figures confirm that the control system has a real effect on 
the public procurement procedures. Finally it is discussed whether the level 
of interference in public procurement procedures is too high or whether the 
rate of irregularities really makes the application of this system necessary.
2 Key Stages of the Public Procurement Procedure
Conducting a public procurement procedure involves a significant amount of 
preparation and a number of decisions. Preparation and planning are critical 
and influence all future activity on the contract. However it is often the case 
that the contracting authority will either underestimate the planning stage of 
the process or not carry it out at all (European Union, 2015). The most signifi-
cant decision that has to be made during the preparation process is the ‘deci-
sion on what to purchase’. Here we are concerned with the choice of a con-
tracting authority as to what goods, services or works it wishes to purchase 
in order to fulfil its needs. While the Directives do not impose restrictions on 
“what to buy”, in fact for EU funded projects there are restrictions imposed by 
EU legislation in form of the so called eligible costs. So for the eligibility part 
the contracting authority who is a beneficiary of EU funds must carefully se-
lect the goods, service or works it wishes to buy from the funds awarded to it.
2.1 Preparatory stages
Once the first step described above is made, it must be decided how the pur-
chase is going to be made, i.e. whether a public procurement is necessary. Any 
purchase has to be made by means of a formal public procurement procedure, 
as long as the estimated value of the procurement exceeds the thresholds set 
out in the Directives (or the corresponding national legislation). Nevertheless, 
the contracting authority should check whether any exceptions3 in the Direc-
tive are applicable.
2.2 Designing the procedure
As long as it has been established that a public procurement procedure is nec-
essary, the procedure has to be planned very carefully. All necessary informa-
3 E.g. in-house procurement, research and development services etc.
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tion has to be set out in the procurement documents, which has to be made 
available to all the potential tenderers interested in the contract.
An important feature of the procurement documents is the definition of 
technical specifications which is a detailed description of the product, ser-
vice or work to be purchased. The decision as to what to put in the technical 
specifications can be influenced by the involvement of experts, and also by 
the rules that ensure that there is no discrimination against certain economic 
operators. Where possible, specifications should be defined in terms of per-
formance or functional requirements and if there is a reference to certain 
standards or if standards or in exceptional cases specific makes or sources are 
referred to, the description must use the words ‘or equivalent’.
The contracting authority must also make an important decision when choos-
ing the most appropriate procedure for conducting the procurement. Under 
the Directive, open and restricted procedures can always be used, while other 
types (competitive procedure with negotiation, competitive dialogue and ne-
gotiated procedure without publication of notice) are only available if certain 
strict conditions are met.
Another important aspect of the procedure is the definition by the public 
authority as to what selection criteria and award criteria should apply dur-
ing the procedure. The contracting authority may also set conditions for the 
performance of the contract, which, according to the Directive, may include 
economic, innovation-related, environmental, social or employment-related 
considerations.
2.3 Conducting the procedure and awarding contract
Once the procurement documents have been prepared and tenders (or re-
quests to participate) have been submitted, a series of decisions have to be 
made during the conduct of the procedure. First the contracting authority 
must establish whether the tenders (or requests to participate) conform to the 
conditions set out in the procurement documents and the applicable legisla-
tion. In case some documents have not been submitted, a request for the sup-
ply of missing information should be issued to the tenderers concerned. Under 
this principle only minor errors may be corrected and any changes must not 
affect any features of the offer which are evaluated under the award criteria. 
So, whether to allow the supply of missing information or correct errors is an 
important decision, again, subject to legislative restrictions and strict controls.
Probably the most important decision that a contracting authority has to 
make in a public procurement procedure is to whom the contract should be 
awarded. This must be based on the evaluation of tenders on the basis of the 
award criteria set out in the procurement documents. In case only numerical 
criteria are used (e.g. price and cost only) then the selection of the winner 
is essentially automatic, based on the tenders submitted. However, in case 
subjective criteria are used (e.g. aesthetic characteristics, quality of staff), 
then the contracting authority does have a certain amount of discretion in 
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the evaluation of these aspects. Nevertheless, this discretion is again limited 
by the principles of equal treatment and transparency, which is subject to the 
control mechanisms described in section 3.
Finally one must mention that a decision whether, after the its signature, the 
contract should be modified, is also strictly limited by the Public Procurement 
Directives. Modifications without assessment of the strictly defined condi-
tions are inter alia possible where the so called de minimis conditions are ful-
filled: where the value of the modification is below 1) the EU threshold values, 
and 2) 10 % of the initial contract value for service and supply contracts and 
below 15 % of the initial contract value for works contracts. In addition the 
modification may not alter the overall nature of the contract.
3 The Public Procurement Control System
3.1 The necessity and possible effects of establishing 
a control system
In general, efficient enforcement is of utmost importance for compliance 
with the rules in any field of law, including public procurement (Arrowsmith 
2011). The EU obliges all Member States to have an effective remedies sys-
tem in order to increase compliance with the rules. However this is not always 
thought to be sufficient, since applying for remedies might be a costly and 
burdensome exercise and not all interested parties might be willing to start 
a case before the competent review bodies. So most EU Member States have 
decided to set up additional control systems to increase compliance with the 
legislation on public procurement.
The control processes receive special attention in the context of EU funds, 
due to the severe sanctions and the possible loss of funding. The statistics 
also show that public procurement is a risky area in the context of using EU 
funds. In fact when spending EU funds, public procurement is the area most 
affected by irregularities in the EU Member States. For the 2007-2013 EU 
programming period, 349 billion euro was allocated in the area of cohesion 
policy through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohe-
sion Fund (CF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). Almost half of all projects 
in relation to these three funds audited by the European Court of Auditors 
(ECA) over the 2009-2013 period involved one or several tenders (ECA, 2015). 
According to the experience of audits, the infringement of the public pro-
curement rules was the most significant type of irregularity that occurred 
during the implementation of the Funds mentioned (ECA, 2015). According 
to a system audit of ECA in 2011, 44% of quantifiable errors were related to 
public procurement (ECA, 2011). These infringements can have serious con-
sequences. If a breach of the rules is found, then the European Commission 
(or the Member State authorities) may impose financial corrections, meaning 
that the EU financial support from the project is partially or totally withdrawn. 
In addition if the public procurement system does not function properly, pay-
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ment of funds may also be suspended, causing potential delays in the neces-
sary payments to be made.
Public procurement procedures also involve a quite high corruption risk. This 
partly comes from the fact that large sums are available from EU funds and 
there is some discretion on how to allocate funding. A study involving the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary revealed that when additional public 
resources became available for discretionary allocation, there was a consid-
erable increase of corruption but this could be counter-balanced by more 
stringent regulation, monitoring, and transparency (Fazekas et. al. 2013). The 
risk of corruption involving EU funds is also an issue in other countries such 
as Romania, which also has a large share of EU funds in its public spending 
(Dimulescu et al. 2013). Beyond the European context, in the American litera-
ture we can also find reference to the importance of internal controls to fight 
procurement fraud (Rendon and Rendon 2015).
When concluding its Partnership Agreement for the use EU funds, the Eu-
ropean Commission established that Hungary did not meet the so called ex 
ante conditionality related to public procurement. The evaluation related 
for example to the arrangements for the effective application of EU public 
procurement rules and ensuring the adequate transparency of award proce-
dures. Therefore an action plan was agreed with the Commission in order to 
ensure compliance. A proper control system was a key feature of the action 
plan, ensuring the fulfilment of the conditions established. Therefore a desire 
to reduce the number of irregularities coupled with a pressure from the Com-
mission was the main reason to establish the current system of controls.
In light of the above, strict controls of EU funded public procurement have 
the aim of ensuring the lawful spending of funds and avoiding the loss of 
funding from the EU through changing the attitudes and behaviour of public 
authorities. If funds are withdrawn, then the burden of paying for the pro-
jects in question falls exclusively on the national budgets. While changing the 
behaviour of authorities is a key element to success, it is also important to 
design the control process in a way that does not constitute an excessive bur-
den for public authorities that receive EU funds. In particular the delays, the 
administrative burdens and the autonomy of the decision-making should be 
minimised. Nevertheless our hypothesis is that a “fear” of being controlled 
always changes the way in which the controlled entities behave. In an ideal 
situation they ensure that their procurement decisions are always in conform-
ity with the public procurement rules and therefore auditors will not find any 
irregularities in the procurement processes. Furthermore, strict control can 
also cause them to be very careful in the application of the rules, leading to a 
situation where they do not carry out their procurement in the most official 
and optimal way, but use procedures and criteria which surely conform to the 
relevant legislation.
For monitoring the correct use of EU funds, Hungary has opted for a very 
strict control system, which has various elements of ex ante, ex post control 
and control integrated in the process. This is supplemented by the manda-
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tory remedies system required by EU law4 other checks by national audit 
authorities and the control of public procurement notices by the Public Pro-
curement Authority. The key feature of the system is that practically all EU 
funded public procurement procedures are subject to the mandatory control 
process. The main Hungarian body responsible for the control of public pro-
curements funded from EU funds is the Department for Public Procurement 
Control (DPPC) of the Prime Minister’s Office. Lower value procurements are 
controlled by the competent Managing Authority (authority responsible for 
selecting beneficiaries of EU funds). The control system is described below in 
more detail.
3.2 The international perspective
The amount of literature on the control systems of other countries is fairly 
scarce. Nevertheless from the information available it can be seen that they 
tend to be less comprehensive than the Hungarian system. A detailed com-
parative study has been carried out for the Public Procurement Network by 
Bianchi and Guidi (2010), which can offer an insight into the institutional sys-
tem of EU Member States, including the authorities responsible for the super-
vision of public procurements. According to the study, a number of countries, 
such as Italy, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece and Spain appoint their na-
tional court of auditors to control the legality of public procurement proce-
dures. In other countries the role of supervision and control is carried out by 
specialised bodies that belong to the government structure (Lithuania, Po-
land, Romania, Slovakia and Malta). In Slovenia, audits are carried out by the 
National review Commission whose members are nominated by Parliament. 
In some countries the supervision of public procurements belong to the na-
tional competition authority, which is the case in the Czech Republic, Sweden, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Denmark. In Greece, controls are carried out 
before the conclusion of the contract by the national court of auditors for 
contracts above EUR 1 million. In Italy an independent body, the Authority for 
the Supervision of Public Contracts has been set up.
In Poland the main controller of procurement procedures compliance is the 
Public Procurement Orders Agency, which carries out scheduled and un-
scheduled documentary inspections of procurement at the request of state 
bodies, public organizations and citizens and analyses information in the 
procurement bulletin. Procurements that are financed or co-financed by EU 
funds, equal to or exceeding EUR 10 million in respect of the procurement 
of goods and services and EUR 20 million in the case of works are subject to 
mandatory control (Yaremenko and Shatkoviskiy). Further, a good example 
of a country taking steps to fight corruption in public procurement is Malta, 
which has also established a system investigating fraud and corruption in 
Public Procurement, where after receiving any form of reporting concerning 
fraudulent activities in public procurement, the Director of Contracts, after 
4 Directive 89/665/EEC on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provi-
sions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public 
works contracts (as emended by Directive 2007/66/EC)
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having conducted his own investigations, can forward reports and findings to 
the Police Commissioner or the Internal Audit and Investigations Department 
(Department of Contracts 2017).
The main feature of the supervisory bodies mentioned is that unlike in the 
Hungarian case, their controls are based on a sample of procedures and in 
some cases on complaints, so generally they do not control every single pro-
cedure. In Sweden for example priority is given to cases where the authority 
thinks that their actions will have the desired effect (SCA, 2016). The Finnish 
authority also seeks to focus on the essential issues and avoid inflexible and 
prolonged procedures (FCCA, 2017). Furthermore, generally the approach of 
other countries outside Hungary is that no prior consent of the control body 
is required to launch the procedure or to award and conclude the contract. 
For example in the case of Poland, in general the Public Procurement Orders 
Agency may make recommendations, turn to the review body or fine the con-
tracting authority (Yaremenko and Shatkoviskiy). As we saw above, manda-
tory ex ante controls do also exist in Poland, however their thresholds are 
much higher than in the case of Hungary. Finally it should be reiterated that 
controls of national courts of auditors generally close with a report stating 
the evaluation of the controlled activities and containing recommendations 
on how to address these (Mazur 2016).
3.3 Ex ante controls
In Hungary, ex ante controls are carried out by the DPPC for public supply 
contracts, public service contracts and public service concessions reaching or 
exceeding the EU thresholds and for public works contracts and public works 
concessions reaching or exceeding HUF 300 million (approx. EUR 1 million). In 
this control process both the competent Managing Authority and the DPPC 
are involved.
As a first step the contracting authority (who in this case is also the beneficiary) 
must send the procurement documents to the Managing Authority who checks 
the eligibility, accountability and technical aspects of the procurement within 
5 working days. The contracting authority must modify the documents, if nec-
essary, in accordance with the comments of the Managing Authority. Then the 
contracting authority sends the procurement documents to the DPPC for ex 
ante control. Control by the DPPC is carried out in two stages. First the DPPC 
checks whether exclusion criteria, selection criteria, award criteria, contract 
performance conditions and securities ensuring contract performance have 
been defined in conformity with the public procurement rules. A certificate 
on the launching of the procedure is issued within 5 working days. If it is found 
that some aspect of the procedure does not comply with the law, then the 
documents, including the contract notice must be amended. When this pro-
cess is complete, the DPPC checks all other public procurement law aspects of 
the relevant documents within another 5 working days. During both processes 
calls for missing documents may also be issued, which can slow down the pro-
cess considerably. Finally a supportive certificate, a supportive certificate with 
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conditions or a non-supportive certificate is issued with respect to the con-
tract documents. In the second case amendments to the documents must be 
made, while in the last case the documents must be withdrawn.
It must be highlighted that until the end of 2016, the ex ante control was car-
ried out in one step and the contracting authority was barred from starting 
the procedure until a supportive certificate (with or without conditions) was 
issued by the DDPC. However the legislation in force from 1 January 2017 now 
allows the contracting authority to start the procedure at the same time as 
sending the documents to the DPPC (expect for accelerated procedures or ne-
gotiated procedures without publication of a notice). The decision to start the 
proceedings (i.e. publication of the notice) in parallel with the controls is a sig-
nificant one, since the contracting authority cannot be sure that the contract 
documents do not contain any irregularities. This might lead to a necessity to 
amend the contract documents, even several times. Therefore the contracting 
authority is faced between a choice of uncertainty and delays caused by the 
control process. Nevertheless it is expected that the overall time for purchas-
es can be reduced for those contracting authorities that are brave enough to 
launch the procedure before the conclusion of the control procedure.
3.4 Controls integrated in the process
Once the first part of the procurement process is complete, i.e. the time limit 
for submitting tenders has been reached; the control process is continued 
with a control integrated in the process. The DPPC delegates an observer to 
each procedure who has the right to attend the meetings of the evaluation 
committee and has to right to observe all documents and decisions related to 
the procedure. At the end of the procedure all documents have to be sent to 
the observer who, within 10 working days, issues a closing certificate on the 
lawfulness of the procedure.
Since 1 January 2017 the contracting authority may award the contract at 
the same time as the control procedure is carried out and may also conclude 
the contract; however the contract cannot come into force until the DPPC 
has issued a supportive closing certificate. In this case the contracting author-
ity is faced with the same dilemma as with ex ante controls. It has to make a 
decision whether to wait for the closing certificate from the DPPC or award 
and even conclude the contract in order not to delay the procedure. In the 
latter case it has to be fairly confident that everything has been carried out 
lawfully during the procedure. Otherwise it might have to repeat the award 
process and conclude the contract with a different economic operator. This 
dilemma also has a significant potential to affect the decisions concerning the 
exclusion and evaluation of tenders and the award of the contract. Neverthe-
less, despite causing some uncertainty, the change of the regulation could be 
beneficial for the contracting authority as it can conclude the contract faster, 
since it is not necessary to wait for the decision of the DPPC. There are only 
difficulties if a non-supportive certificate is issued.
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3.5 Other controls
In the view of the authors, the most significant control processes that have an 
effect on the public procurement procedure are those described in sections 
3.3 and 3.4 above. Nevertheless it must be highlighted that other control pro-
cedures also exist and they too have some potential of impacting the public 
procurement procedure. For public supply and public service contracts above 
the EU thresholds and public works contracts above HUF 300 million ex ante 
control is also carried out for the modification of contracts. Control is first 
carried out within 5 working days by the Managing Authority on eligibility, 
accountability and technical aspects, and then the public procurement law 
aspects of the modification are checked by the DPPC within 13 working days 
from the receipt of the documents. In all cases the contracting authority has 
5 working days for sending the revised documents (if revision is necessary) 
to the DPPC. Any further comments by the DPPC must be sent to the con-
tracting authority within 7 working days. Once the contract is amended, the 
amendment also has to be sent to the Managing Authority who may initiate 
irregularity proceedings or a procedure for remedies if it thinks that the modi-
fication is not in conformity with the relevant rules. Therefore extra care must 
also be taken when the contracting authority decides to modify an existing 
public procurement contract.
Contracts below the above mentioned thresholds are also subject to control, 
but that other process is much simpler. In that case the Managing Authority 
must be notified of the conclusion of the contract amendment and must be 
provided with the written summary of the procedure and all other procure-
ment documents. The Managing Authority checks these within 7 working 
days. If any irregularities are found an irregularity procedure, or in case of 
a breach of the public procurement rules, a procedure for remedies may be 
initiated.
It must be mentioned that in addition to the above, general controls also ex-
ist for all public procurement procedures. Contract notices are controlled by 
the Public Procurement Authority to see if they conform to formal require-
ments and public procurement law aspects. However the Authority may only 
call upon the contracting authority to correct any deemed irregularities, but 
does not have to power to block the launch of procedures or the coming into 
force of the contracts. Furthermore the Authority carries out checks on the 
performance of contracts as well. If irregularities are found, review proceed-
ings may be initiated by the Authority. While these are considered to be less 
significant and less rigorous than the controls carried out for EU funded pro-
curements, these may also affect the way in which contracting authorities act 
and the decisions they make during the procedure.
4 Analysis of Data
As part of the research, data has been requested from the DPPC on the is-
suing of the relevant certificates. Besides the types of certificates, the DPPC 
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also collected data on the number of cases where the contracting author-
ity issued a non-supportive certificate (i.e. did not allow the procedure to go 
ahead or continue), but following the revision of documents, a supportive cer-
tificate was issued with respect to the same procedure. This latter case means 
that some decision(s) had to be changed during the procedure, in order to 
have the possibility to complete it and sign the contract. Furthermore data 
has been obtained from the Public Procurement Authority on the duration 
of public procurement procedures from the year 2013 until mid-2017. The 
changes in the length of procedures can therefore be contrasted with the is-
suing of certificates and the number of EU funded public procurements.
4.1 Data selection methodology
When selecting the data it was important to see quantitative figures on the 
issuing of certificates to see the volume of the work done by the DPPC and 
how many public procurement procedures might be affected by its decisions. 
The split between supportive and non-supportive decisions was also impor-
tant since it is the latter which has a truly significant effect on the purchases, 
as in this case the procedure has to be abandoned or re-started. The distinc-
tion between the quality control certificates and regularity certificates was 
also important, since the former has more of a preventive nature in that a 
procedure containing some irregularity is stopped before it is launched (or 
before the tenders are evaluated), while the number of regularity certificates 
indicate the opinion of the DPPC on the whole conduct of the procedure. In 
the latter case errors are more difficult to be corrected. However in order 
to see the link between the issuing of certificates and the changing of the 
behaviour of public authorities, data was requested on the number of cases 
where there was a change in the process having an effect of regularizing the 
procedure (i.e. making the public procurement procedure lawful). The num-
ber of opinions on contract amendments was also requested in order to see 
the possible difficulties faced by public authorities after the tendering phase, 
in case they had to modify the concluded contract for some reason. Finally, 
to put the issuing of certificated into the wider context, data was used from 
the Public Procurement Authority on the ratio of EU funded and nationally 
funded public procurements.
The data selection process was limited, however, by the data that is actually 
collected and recorded by the DPPC. As regards the time span, data on the 
issuing of certificates was available from 2012, while data on the changing of 
certificates was only available for 2015 and 2016. It would have also been use-
ful to obtain figures on the actual length of time it took for the DPPC to issue 
certificates, however such data could not be provided by the DPPC. Therefore 
the analysis has to be restricted to any conclusions that could be drawn from 
the limited amount of data available.
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4.2 Number of quality control certificates issued
In the 2012-2016 period the distribution of supportive and non-supportive 
certificates with respect to the quality control phase (ex ante) were the fol-
lowing:
Figure 1: Number of Quality Control Certificates 2012-2016
ϯϵϳϲ
ϭϰϯϭ
^ƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞ
EŽŶͲƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞ
ϯϵϳϲ
ϭϰϯϭ
^ƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞ
EŽŶͲƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞ
Source: data received from the DPPC.
Table 1: Annual breakdown of Quality Control Certificates sent out
Year
Type of quality control 
certificate
Number
2012
supportive 837
non-supportive 416
2013
supportive 1452
non-supportive 287
2014
supportive 768
non-supportive 488
2015
supportive 628
non-supportive 166
2016
supportive 291
non-supportive 74
Source: data received from the DPPC.
The data shows that when public procurement documents were subjected 
to ex ante controls (the quality control phase), the majority of contracting 
authorities received a green light from the DPPC. It was only in 1431 cases 
within the 4-year period examined where the launch of the procedure was 
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denied due to non-compliance with the relevant legislation and principles. In 
these cases the contracting authority had to change its mind in what to in-
clude in the contract documents or in extreme cases decide not to go ahead 
with the procurement. While there is no data on what change each of these 
procedures entailed, the errors could relate for example to discriminatory se-
lection criteria, award criteria or technical specifications. These then have to 
be re-thought by the contracting authority.
Non-supportive certificates amounted to approximately 26% of all certificates 
issued. This does not mean that errors were found in such a proportion of 
cases, since the figure concerning supportive certificates also includes those 
cases where a non-supportive certificate was later changed to a supportive 
certificate following an amendment of documents (see below). Therefore the 
actual rate of errors could in fact be higher. In any case it can be observed 
from the data that the DPPC has filtered out a significant number of errors 
in the control process and in many cases the existence of the controls had a 
direct impact on the conduct of public authorities. In addition it can be sup-
posed that the strict control process also impacted on the conduct of those 
public authorities that received a supportive certificate. First of all the exist-
ence of the control system might have an effect in “regularizing” procedures 
in the first place. Secondly in many of the procedures the DPPC provides com-
ments on the procurement documents and issues the supportive certificates 
on the basis of conditions that have to be fulfilled by the contracting author-
ity (e.g. amending or completing certain parts of the documents). Therefore 
even in many of the 3976 cases when the supportive certificate was issued, 
decisions had to take into account the opinion (or potential opinion) of the 
control body.
It must be remembered that prior to 2017, it was unlawful to start the proce-
dure before the supportive quality control certificate was issued, therefore 
it is possible that contracting authorities relied more on the decision of the 
DPPC to correct any mistakes and were less careful in their decision on what 
they included in the procurement documents. It is submitted that in the cur-
rent regime, described above in section 3, contracting authorities need to 
take extra care if they decide to launch the procedure before being in pos-
session of a supportive certificates. Otherwise they have to go through the 
inconvenience of having to modify the procurement documents and possi-
bly even the conditions for participating in the tender, which in certain cases 
even leads to an obligation to prolong the time limit to submit tenders.
4.3 Number of regularity certificates issued
In the 2012-2016 periods the distribution of supportive and non-supportive 
certificates with respect to the regularity phase (integrated into the process) 
was the following:
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Figure 2: Number of Regularity Certificates 2012-2016
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EŽŶͲƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞ
Source: data received from the DPPC.
Table 2: Annual breakdown of Regularity Certificates sent out
Year Type of regularity certificate Number
2012 supportive 813
non-supportive 27
2013 supportive 1065
non-supportive 28
2014 supportive 916
non-supportive 57
2015 supportive 862
non-supportive 51
2016 supportive 191
non-supportive 8
Source: data received from the DPPC.
It can be seen from the data that in the 2012-2016 period compliance with 
the law during the conduct of the procedure was much higher than during the 
quality control phase. In the five-year period only 171 non-supportive regular-
ity certificates were issued, which is a relatively low proportion, compared to 
the total number of certificates, which was 4018. This means that only just 
over 4% of the certificates were non-supportive. Here again there can be a 
significant overlap between the two categories as in many cases supportive 
certificates might have been issued later on for procedures which initially re-
ceived a non-supportive certificate. However, even if we supposed that in all 
171 cases the issuing of the non-supportive certificate was followed by a sup-
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portive certificate, the rate of procedures with a non-supportive certificate 
first time round would still be only just below 4.5%.
From the above it is evident that the direct impact of the non-supportive cer-
tificates has been much less in the regulatory phase, as there were relatively 
few cases which resulted in a need for the contracting authority to change 
its decisions. There can be various explanations for this phenomenon. One 
possible argument is that any irregularities had already been dealt with in the 
quality control phase and once all the documents were correct, the likelihood 
of the contracting authority committing errors was reduced. Furthermore, as 
mentioned in section 3, the DPPC must delegate an observer to each proce-
dure. Normally the observer only controls the documents submitted and only 
takes part in the actual procedure in exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless 
the observer has the possibility to comment on the actions of the contracting 
authority so it is likely that any potential unlawful decisions are settled before 
the issuing of certificates, so in practice very few non-supportive certificates 
are issued. Still, it can be said that the control process itself has an actual im-
pact on the way that decisions are made during the procurement procedure.
As discussed in section 3, until the end of 2016, the award of the contract 
could not be made until the regularity certificate was issued. However, as 
from 1 January 2017, the contracting authority may decide to award and 
even conclude the contract, provided that it comes into force only when the 
supportive certificate by the DPPC is issued. This creates a new dilemma for 
contracting authorities and it will be interesting to see in the future how this 
impacts on the decision-making process.
4.4 Opinions and comments on contract amendments
The DPPC has also been active in controlling the proposed amendment of 
contracts. The following table shows the number of such controls and their 
distribution:
Table 3: Opinions on contract amendments and 
further comments 2012-2016
Lawful 2502
Not lawful 519
Partially lawful 304
Total 3325
Source: data received from the DPPC.
It can be seen from the data that compared to the number of non-supportive 
regularity certificates; the proportion of contract amendments deemed “not 
lawful” by the DPPC has been quite high (around 15%). If we add the “not law-
ful” and “partially lawful” opinions, then the figure is almost 25%. This is simi-
lar to the proportion of non-supportive quality control certificates. This shows 
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that while public authorities seem to take extra care during the conduct of 
the procedure, compared to the preparatory stages, at the stage of contract 
amendments they again become less aware of the legal requirements. There-
fore the direct impact of the control process is also quite significant at this 
stage of the process.
4.5 The “regularization” of documents and decisions
An interesting dimension of the control process involves looking at the num-
ber of cases which actually led to contracting authorities taking actions to cor-
rect any errors in their documents or the decisions affecting the procedure 
(i.e. “regularize” documents and decisions). The main purpose of the control 
process of course is not to punish the contracting authorities for any irregu-
larities, but to help them carry out their procurements in a lawful way, thus 
avoiding any negative consequences later on both for the contracting author-
ity itself (e.g. having to pay damages) and the Member State (e.g. financial 
corrections).
The number of cases where errors were corrected, so that a supportive cer-
tificate was issued in 2015-2016 was distributed between the types of certifi-
cate, as follows:
Figure 3: Amendment of documents in a way to change a non-supportive 
certificate to a supportive certificate 2015-2016
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Source: data received from the DPPC.
Table 4: Number of quality control certificates
Year 2015 2016
Supportive 628 291
Non-supportive 166 74
Source: data received from the DPPC.
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2/2018 149
The Impact of the Public Procurement Control System on the Hungarian Public Administration
Table 5: Number of regularity control certificates
Year 2015 2016
Supportive 862 191
Non-supportive 51 8
Source: data received from the DPPC.
In addition there was a change in the DPPC’s position from irregular/com-
bined to regular in case of contract amendments in 2015-2016 in a total of 69 
cases.5 It is unfortunate that no data is available for procedures prior to 2015.
Using the data our findings discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 can be confirmed, 
namely that the control process had much more direct impact on contracting 
authorities’ conduct in the quality control phase than in the regularity phase. 
There were only 36 occasions in the regularity phase where decisions were 
“regularized”, which is only 16% of the total number of cases when this hap-
pened. The 191 cases of changing to a supportive certificate seem reasonable 
in the light that in 2015-2016 there were 240 non-supportive certificates. The 
explanation for the difference is that some contracting authorities might have 
abandoned their procurement procedures as a result of the non-supportive 
certificate. Nevertheless it can be seen that in the vast majority of cases er-
rors have been subsequently rectified. The ratio of rectification of errors for 
the regulatory phase is slightly lower, which shows that controls caused that 
contracting authorities not to complete the procedure in more cases than in 
the quality control phase.
The relatively low numbers may also be the result of contracting authorities 
being more careful about the regularity of their procurements and now they 
have more experience about the DPPC’s approach, i.e. the types of errors 
which lead to issuing a non-supportive certificate. Therefore in 2015-2016 
the direct impact of controls were less significant than the possible indirect 
impact resulting from a “fear” of controls and the possible issuing of non-
supportive certificates.
4.6 Average duration of public procurement procedures
It is also interesting to consider the average duration of public procurement 
procedures as the control system might have impacted on this. Unfortunately 
the data obtained from the Public Procurement Authority does not separate 
procedures funded from EU funds and those funded from purely national 
funds. However the trend in the speed of conducting procedures between 
2013 and the first half of 2017 can be seen from the following table:
5 Source: data received from the DPPC
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Table 6: Average duration of public procurement procedures in Hungary6
Year
Average duration 
of procedures (days)
2013 113.15
2014 138.71
2015 156.31
2016 204.85
2017 (Q1-Q2) 212.11
Source: Public Procurement Authority.
The table shows that the duration of procedures has increased quite signifi-
cantly, in fact the average public procurement procedure took almost twice 
as long in 2017 than in 2013. However if we look at decision speed (the time 
between the deadline for receiving tenders and the award of the contract), 
Hungary is still deemed acceptable by the European Commission’s 2017 Sin-
gle Market Scoreboard (2017), as the length of decision-making was below 
120 days. In this indicator Hungary did better than the data for the Czech 
Republic, Ireland, Greece, Italy and Slovakia.
Together with this data the changes in the proportion of EU funded proce-
dures can also be contrasted. It is clear that changes in the proportion of dif-
ferent funding sources in the procurements do not affect the speed at which 
procurement decisions are made. While for example in 2016 there has been 
a sharp drop in the percentage of procedures financed from EU funds, the 
duration of procedures showed a significant increase.
In addition, as shown above, the number of quality control and regularity certif-
icates has also decreased significantly in 2016 in line with the reduction of the 
number of EU funded procedures. This also suggests that the time taken for 
public procurement procedures must have also been affected by other factors.
Table 7: Proportion of public procurement procedures connected to EU 
funds in Hungary
Year
Value of 
procurements
Number of 
procedures
2012 54.1% 43.2%
2013 61.1% 50.8%
2014 49.2% 50.2%
2015 38.1% 45.9%
2016 29.9% 16.2%
Source: Public Procurement Authority.
6 Data includes all procedures with a contract notice both above and below the public pro-
curement thresholds. Data is based on the dates provided by contracting authorities in the 
relevant notices.
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Unfortunately there is no data available on the actual duration of control 
procedures carried out by the DPPC. Therefore it cannot be concluded that 
any of the increase in the duration of the procedures would be due to an in-
crease in the length of the control process. However it can be said that with 
the process of purchasing taking longer and longer, strict controls lasting sev-
eral weeks definitely do not help those contracting authorities who wish to 
carry out EU funded public procurements quickly and effectively. One must 
remember that the data on the duration only includes potentially the controls 
integrated in the process, as ex ante controls (at least until 2016) take place 
prior to the launch of the procedures. This means that the actual process for 
higher value procedures funded from EU funds is even longer.
4.7 Discussion of findings and recommendations
From the above it is clear that the Hungarian control system has a direct ef-
fect on some public procurement procedures co-financed by EU funds. Direct 
influence occurs when the result of the control process leads to an actual 
change in the public procurement documents, potentially affecting even the 
final outcome of procedures, i.e. to whom the contract is awarded in the end. 
It can also be supposed that decisions of contracting authorities are also being 
influenced indirectly by making them more aware of the correct interpreta-
tion of the rules and making them more careful in applying the rules correctly.
It has been found that most influence throughout the procedure occurs in the 
initial stages of the process, when the procurement documents are submit-
ted to the DPPC. In the controls integrated in the process (regularity phase) 
much less errors have been found, therefore the direct influence on the deci-
sions of contracting authorities have been much less. This means that the big-
gest effect on the conduct of public authorities occurs, when they are putting 
the procurement documents together and setting the subject matter and the 
conditions of the procurement process.
However the data also shows that in fact the majority of procurements re-
ceive a supportive certificate, meaning that no significant errors are found 
that would preclude permission to go ahead with the procedure. Conditions 
can of course be set by the DPPC in its decision, but the largest influence oc-
curs when the public procurement is “blocked” by the DPPC and fundamental 
changes have to be made to the contracting authority’s decisions.
It is also interesting to look at how the number of non-supportive certificates 
compare to the total number of EU funded public procurements in Hungary. 
The data on the latter category is the following:
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Table 8: Number of public procurement procedures connected 
to EU funds in Hungary
2012 3647
2013 6038
2014 7121
2015 6482
2016 1398
Source: Public Procurement Authority.
If we consider that from 2012 until 2016 there have been 24248 procedures 
and in the 2012-2016 period in “only” 1431 cases was a non-supportive qual-
ity control certificate and in 171 cases a non-supportive regularity certificate 
issued, then one might conclude that the direct influence of the control pro-
cedure only affects an insignificant number of public procurements. However 
it must be remembered that the DPPC’s control only concerns higher value 
procurements and the data from the Public Procurement Authority includes 
all public procurements regardless of their value. Therefore it can be conclud-
ed that the control of the DPPC is directly affecting a smaller proportion of 
procurement procedures, but these belong to the higher value categories, 
therefore has a more significant effect on the correct use of EU funds than 
would appear from the data.
Despite the seemingly positive impact on the decision-making, one must not 
forget that the ex ante control system causes the public procurement proce-
dures to be significantly delayed compared to a situation that if no such con-
trol existed. It is notable that checking of notices by the Public Procurement 
Authority (required also for nationally funded procurements), was already 
thought to delay the launch of the procedures (Tátrai 2011), even though 
that is a much simpler procedure than the mandatory controls for EU funded 
procurements. Therefore it is not surprising that contracting authorities in 
Hungary often complain about the control procedures being too slow and 
constituting an excessive burden for them when carrying out their public 
procurements.7 The average duration of all public procurement procedures 
has increased in recent years. Although, as mentioned above, there is insuf-
ficient data to prove that this trend has been affected by the control process, 
a faster and more efficient control system could make the job of contracting 
authorities somewhat easier. Further, it can be seen that even if all the dead-
lines set out in the legislation were fully observed by the control body (which 
might not always be the case) it still adds a significant amount of time for the 
procedures to be completed where both ex ante control and control integrat-
ed in the process are used. In the light of this and the data discussed above, 
it is questionable whether such a complex procedure is really necessary, es-
pecially if errors are found only in a small proportion of procedures. It is also 
7 The system applicable as from 1 January 2017 has the aim of lessening the delays caused by 
the controls, however as discussed above, launching the procedure before controls are fin-
ished leads to less legal certainty and possible problems later on in the process.
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questionable whether it is really necessary to check all of the procedures, as 
this causes a burden and increases the time of the procedures for every single 
contracting authority engaged in EU funded public procurement.
In light of the number of errors occurring it is evident that putting a strong 
system of control for EU funded public procurements is inevitable in Hungary. 
Nevertheless the additional time taken by the existence of the control system 
is not proportionate to the necessary interference in the decision-making of 
contracting authorities. Therefore it would be better to have a control sys-
tem, which takes into account more the necessity of speed and efficiency 
when conducting public procurements.
In the view of the authors the Government should re-think the necessity of 
the current system and take steps to streamline the control process. The 
starting point should be a more in-depth analysis of the behavioural patterns 
of contracting authorities as a result of the control process. In a policy con-
text, it could be made sure that policy-makers rely on evidence, not assump-
tions, as suggested by Bavel et al. (2013) in their policy paper written for the 
European Commission.
Then alternative options should be explored such as controls based on sam-
ples in the way that EU projects are audited in general. The relatively small 
amount of errors found in the control integrated into the process (regularity 
phase) also questions calls its necessity into question, since it seems that the 
vast majority of contracting authorities comply with the rules, once the pro-
curement documents are in order. Higher value projects could be subjected to 
mandatory controls, however it is proposed that the thresholds above which 
this is done are increased considerably. This would allow the DPPC or any an-
other competent body to focus on the most important cases only where the 
financial risk is larger.
A concentrating of resources on the most risky procedures or contracting 
authorities with a poor record of compliance with the rules could also be a 
viable option. This would also be an incentive for authorities to comply, since 
then they would not be in the focus of control bodies, resulting in a reduction 
of administrative burden for them. In parallel the proportion of procedures 
subject to ex post control could be increased, which does not have an effect 
of slowing down procedures so much. It is submitted that by switching to 
a higher proportion of ex post controls the dissuasive effect of the system 
would not go away, since the possibility of irregularity procedures and the 
withdrawal of funding would still remain. However contracting authorities 
could be incentivised to focus more on ensuring the legality of procedures as 
they would not be able to rely on certificates of the DPPC to ensure prior to 
or during the procedure that what they are doing is lawful. The DPPC already 
provides significant guidance for contracting authorities on what aspects 
should be taken into account when preparing and conducting public procure-
ment, highlighting also the most common errors that are found when prepar-
ing procedures (Deputy State Secretariat for Public Procurement Supervision 
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2017a and 2017b). Therefore there is already significant help available from 
the control body that contracting authorities can rely on.
5 Conclusion
Hungary has established a very strong control system for public procurements 
funded from EU-funds. This strict system is used for higher value procure-
ments, while for procedures with a lower estimated value a lighter regime 
is used. It has been found that ex ante controls carried out by the DPPC has 
an appreciable impact on the decisions of public authorities when designing 
their procedures. The controls also seem to have a similar direct impact on the 
decisions relating to the amendment of contracts. In the phase of conduct-
ing the procedure public authorities tend to have a lower error rate as seen 
from the data on the number of non-supportive certificates, however infor-
mal contacts with the DPPC’s observer is also liable to influence procedures 
considerably. Due to insufficient data it cannot be proven that the increasing 
duration of procedures is caused by delays in the control process, however 
in the opinion of the authors more efficient controls could be a useful step 
in improving the situation. Even if the deadlines set out in the legislation had 
been duly kept by the DPPC the additional time for launching and completing 
the procedures could be quite significant.
On the positive side, the data shows that in 2015-2016 the majority of errors 
found by the DPPC have been corrected, so an initial non-supportive certifi-
cate was “turned into” a supportive certificate later on. While it can be estab-
lished that strict controls are necessary in order to avoid the potential loss 
of EU funds, it is the view of the authors that the actual and potential delays 
caused by the procedures do not necessarily outweigh the reduction of risks 
caused by the strong influence contracting authorities’ decisions. The revised 
system, which has been in place since 1 January 2017, is a step in the right 
direction, but has the problem of the lack of legal certainty. So it is hoped 
that further revisions will be made to lessen the possible negative impact of 
controls even further.
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